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Analyzing Bill C-36:  
The Duality of Women’s Rights in the Canadian Sex Trade 
by Stephanie Anne Mayhue 
Abstract 
 
In 2014, The Protections of Communities and Exploited Persons Act was enacted 
in response to Bedford v. Attorney General of Canada which criminalized the 
purchasing of sexual services, and decriminalized the selling of sexual services, 
on the basis that women in the sex trade are victims in need of protection. The 
purpose of this study is to explore the context in which Bill C-36 emerged, 
analyze it’s claims and highlight its impact on the status of women. This research 
began with a literature review of the three dominant models of prostitution: 
Prohibition, Legalization and the Nordic model, with a great focus on the work of 
Martha Nussbaum and Catharine MacKinnon. This literature was then used to 
analyze the gendered implications of prostitution laws in Canada. The research 
findings present an inherent contradiction in Bill C-36, which aims to protect the 
rights of all women, but simultaneously restricts the rights of female sex workers. 
In conclusion, it is found that Bill C-36 is ignorant to the rights of sex workers, at 
the cost of protecting victims of sex trafficking. Due to the restriction of women’s 
rights, Bill C-36 actually perpetuates the same female subordination it claims to 
oppose.   
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Introduction 
 Historically, women’s treatment under the Canadian Law has been 
controversial, but there is no more controversial topic than women’s treatment 
with regards to sexual autonomy. I have heard various accounts of women in the 
sex trade, some of which were victims of sex trafficking, some who were killed 
during their engagement and others who felt this was their life work. Their 
accounts motivated this research, and manifested a desire to understand how 
gender and autonomy operate under Canadian prostitution laws. In 2009, the 
Bedford v. Attorney General of Canada case challenged three sections of the 
Canadian Constitution, on the basis that it contributed to unsafe working 
conditions, for legal sex work. This challenge resulted in the emergence of Bill C-
36 The Protections of Communities and Exploited Person’s Act, which is the 
subject of this research. Bill C-36 is analyzed through themes of gender, 
patriarchy, autonomy, rights and subordination to answer the questions: How 
does Bill C-36 restrict female autonomy through the criminalization of buying 
sex? How does this further perpetuate female subordination? This work primarily 
draws on the feminist perspectives of Martha Nussbaum and Catharine 
MacKinnon to form its findings. 
Background: 
Bedford v. Attorney General of Canada  
 Before beginning an evaluation of Bill C-36, The Protection of 
Communities and Exploited Persons Act which is the principle subject of this 
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paper, it is vital to understand the aims of the Bedford v. Attorney case, which 
challenged the Canadian Constitution and led to the emergence of Bill C-36. This 
summary will provide the context for Bill C-36, and will demonstrate how the aims 
of Bedford are blatantly disregarded in the government’s creation of the law.  
  Prior to the Bedford v. Attorney case, prostitution was legal in Canada but 
surrounding laws had made almost all activities within prostitution illegal. The 
Bedford case challenge was brought forth by three women: Terri Jean Bedford, 
Valarie Scott and Amy Lebovitch. Terri Jean Bedford has experience as a sex 
worker, but at the time was working as a professional dominatrix. Similarly, 
Valarie Scott has experience as a sex worker in a variety of locations, but since 
then has become an activist supporting the rights of sex worker. Amy Lebovitch 
has studied Criminology and Psychology at University of Ottawa, and Social 
Work at Ryerson University, and was active in the sex trade at the time of this 
case. The three sections of the Criminal Code, called into question were: Section 
210, prohibition on keeping or being in a “bawdy house” for purposes of 
prostitution, paragraph 212(1)(j) procuring and living on the avails of prostitution, 
and paragraph 213(1)(c) prohibition on communicating in public for the purposes 
of prostitution. Bedford argued that these laws were a violation of sex workers 
rights under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (National Film Board of Canada, 
2013). Specifically, the sections above were thought to be in violation of Section 
7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, relating to life, liberty and 
security of person, as well as freedom of expression.  
 Laws such as these, resulted in unsafe work conditions, stigmatization and 
treatment of those in the sex trade as criminals. Bedford argued that because sex 
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work is legal the law is obligated to assist them in making sex work as safe as 
possible. Section 210 perpetuated dangerous conditions by making it illegal for 
sex work to occur inside, forcing all women to work in the streets. The 
procurement law (paragraph 212(1)(j)) made it illegal to live off the avails of 
prostitution, which was intended to target pimps; however the law was too broad 
and as a result made it illegal for sex workers to legitimately higher security, 
secretaries or for their family to benefit from their income. Lastly, the prohibition 
of communication in public for the purposes of prostitution (paragraph 213(1)(c)) 
made it difficult for women to screen their clients before meeting with them, in 
turn, putting them at risk. “In the words of Justice MacPherson, this created, “an 
almost perfect storm of danger for prostitutes” (Ontario Women’s Justice 
Network, 2015, p.4).  
 In 2010, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found the three laws to be a 
violation of sex workers constitutional rights and decided they should be struck 
down. This was appealed to a higher court in March 2012, when the government 
found Section 212 and paragraph 212(1)(j) to be unconstitutional. The 
government decided that the bawdy house law should be struck down, the living 
off the avails law should be changed to only apply in situations of exploitation and 
deemed the communicating law to be constitutional. On June 13, 2013 the 
Bedford case went to the Supreme Court of Canada. On December 20, 2013, the 
Supreme Court released their decision in agreement with the Ontario Superior 
Court, that all three laws were unconstitutional as they violated Section 7 of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Supreme court rejected the governments 
argument that sex workers engage in sex work by choice and positioned that 
Running Head: ANALYZING BILL-C36: DUALITY OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS                                               6 
 
some enter sex work by choice, while others enter by circumstance, but 
ultimately all parties are worthy of legal protections (Ontario Women’s Justice 
Network, 2015). This was a positive decision for sex work advocates; however, it 
caused an uproar for some women’s groups, particularly those who support 
abolition. The Supreme Court gave the government one year to respond. 
Emergence of Bill C-36 
 Bill C-36 was created as the government’s response to the findings of the 
Bedford v. Attorney General of Canada case. The bill was Introduced June 4 
2014, received royal assent on November 6 2014 and came into force December 
6 2014 (Department of Justice, 2017). Overall the bill presents a shift away from 
treating prostitution as a community nuisance and toward the treatment of 
prostitution as a form of sexual exploitation which primarily negatively impacts 
women. The main objectives of the bill are summarised as follows:  
• The majority of prostitutes are women and girls, with a disproportionate 
number being marginalized women 
• Entry into prostitution is influenced by one’s economic position, relating to 
poverty, youth, level of education, and childhood sexual and non-sexual 
abuse.  
• Prostitution is dangerous, causing both physically and psychological 
harms 
• Prostitution reinforces gender inequalities; in that it normalizes the 
treatment of women and girls as commodities who can be bought and sold 
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• Prostitution negatively impacts the communities in which it takes place 
through related criminality, human trafficking, drug related crime etc.  
• Third parties capitalize off of the exploitation of women by facilitating the 
prostitution of others 
(Department of Justice, 2017) 
Overall, the Bill C-36 criminalizes the purchasing of sexual services, but 
decriminalizes the sale of sexual services on the basis that prostitutes 
(predominately women) are “victims” (Department of Justice, 2017, p.3) in need 
of legal protections, while buyers of sexual services (predominantly men) are 
guilty of sexual exploitation and domination. The bill does not condone 
prostitution and in-fact is largely focussed on persuading women to leave the sex 
trade, and to diminish the demand for sexual services, under the assumption that 
availability of sexual services raises the demand for sexual services.  
 It is vital to this paper, to understand the context in which Bill C-36 
emerged and to acknowledge that its abolitionist aims greatly reflect the initial 
laws, which were challenged by Bedford and deemed unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court of Canada. Terri Jean Bedford, Valarie Scott and Amy Lebovitch 
challenged the laws initially, on the basis that they restricted sex workers access 
to security of person and freedom of expression. Although the sections of the 
Criminal Code that were in question have been struck down, the government of 
Canada has resorted to further regulating the sex trade, with little regard for the 
position of Bedford, Lebovitch and Scott. This research intends to examine the 
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relationship between Bill C-36 and women’s position in society, particularly 
female sex workers. 
Limitations 
 I have identified two main limitations of this study and for the purposes of 
reflexivity, it is important that they are articulated here. Firstly, this research is 
heavily derived from white Western women, and therefore may be subject to my 
own bias, or the bias of Nussbaum and MacKinnon, who provide the theoretical 
basis for this work. Although my work is focused on Canadian legislation, I rely on 
international literature (ex. from the US and New Zealand), therefore it is 
important to note that my literature review disregards the many non-English 
speaking academics that have spoken on this topic, and have made valuable 
contributions to the field. It is vital to acknowledge that conclusions made 
regarding the sex trade, may not be applicable cross culturally, because sex work 
is highly dependent on the context in which it takes place, and women’s rights 
vary greatly across boarders.  
 Secondly, due to the complex legal aspects of my research, I am 
identifying problems that at this point, I am unable to solve. The research has 
benefited me in that I have gained an understanding of the types of questions, 
which need to be articulated for future work in constitutional or critical legal theory 
– for example competing rights. From this I know the intellectual space where 
these questions can be addresses, and under the correct legal contexts. In this 
respect, this research acts as a stepping stone for more in-depth analysis to be 
conducted in the future.  
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Authority 
 While writing this I pondered why I even have an authority to speak on this 
topic, considering the push for feminist research to derive from within its 
population. I am a white privileged woman, who has never interacted with the sex 
trade personally, which is why I must support my work with evidence from women 
who are engaged with the sex trade, such as Amy Lebovitch and the teen female 
victim of Renee Allison Webber – who was coerced and manipulated into the sex 
trade. Alternately, as a woman living in Canada, among laws such as Bill C-36, I 
do have a right to speak on this topic. This bill limits my ability to choose what I 
can an cannot do with my own body and on that basis my voice is valid.  
Findings 
Critique #1: Sex Work Versus Sex Trafficking  
 My first critique of Bill C-36, is its broad definitions which lump-together the 
multiple experiences of women in the sex trade. This is harmful because each 
party experiences the sex trade uniquely, and therefore has independent 
expectations of the law. The prohibition of both positions upholds rights to 
security of person, by criminalizing coercive sexual practices experienced by 
some women, while simultaneously restricting the rights and autonomy of other 
women. 
 Bill C-36, broadly defines prostitution as “the exchange of sexual services 
for payment” (p.3) and states “This new offence makes prostitution itself an illegal 
practice; every time prostitution takes place, regardless of venue, an offence is 
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committed” (Department of Justice, 2017, p.3). This definition is problematic 
because it conflates experiences of victimhood with the experiences of 
autonomous women in the sex trade, or potentially does not acknowledge that 
there are autonomous women in the sex trade. The bill criminalizes the 
purchasing of sexual services and states “To determine whether a particular act 
constitutes a “sexual service for consideration” or “prostitution”, the court will 
consider whether the service is sexual in nature and whether the purpose of 
providing the service is to sexually gratify the person who receives it” 
(Department of Justice, 2017, p.3). Although the government claims to restrict the 
purchasing of sexual services on the basis that it victimizes the prostitute, this 
statement reflects the government’s aims to restrict and regulate sexual 
gratification, with no consideration for how the delivering of sexual services is 
internalized by the prostitute. Purchasing sexual gratification from another party is 
illegal, regardless whether harm is caused to the providing party, and despite any 
potential reciprocal gratification. 
 Here I hope to make a distinction between sex work, and trafficking. The 
Canadian Public Health Association (2014) makes the following assertion “Sex 
work refers to the consensual exchange of sexual services between adults for 
money or goods. The trade involves female, male or transgender individuals, and 
can be undertaken in a variety of venues, such as working as escorts, from 
private homes, in strip clubs, in brothels, and seeking clients in public locations” 
(p.3). They then divide sex work into two categories: consensual and exploitive 
and assert that it is very important we distinguish between sex work and sex 
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trafficking. “It is, however, becoming more difficult to differentiate between 
consensual and exploitative sex work, as many sex workers find themselves 
forced into the trade due to the effects of social determinants or structural 
violence* or as a means of survival” (Canadian Public Health Association, 2014, 
p.3). Firstly, an attempt to categorize sex work as consensual or exploitive, 
violates their own definition of sex work as a “consensual exchange” (Canadian 
Public Health Association, 2014, p.3), assuming that exploitive sex work is non-
consensual in their perspective. I deny the notion that we must separate 
consensual sex work from exploitative sex work, which implies that one cannot 
consent to their own exploitation, on the basis that sex work is work, and under 
capitalism all labour is exploitive (this will be discussed further in relation to 
Marx). Going forward I will utilize the definition of Sex Work as provided by the 
Canadian Public Health Association, but I stress that in order for a transaction to 
be deemed sex work it must be consensual, and is not dependent on exploitation, 
therefore no further categorizing is necessary.   
 Alternately, the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (implemented 
in November 2000) utilizes the following definition:  
Trafficking in persons “shall mean the recruitment, transportation, 
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or 
use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of 
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or 
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of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the 
consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, 
the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar 
to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs; (United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004, p.42). 
This definition differs in its approach because it highlights three elements that 
constitute human trafficking in persons: the act, the means, the purpose 
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019). Examples of the ‘act’ 
include recruitment, harbouring or transportation of persons. The ‘means’, 
refers to threat, use of forces, coercion, abduction, deception etc. and the 
‘purpose’, “includes exploiting the prostitution of others, sexual exploitation, 
forced labour, slavery or similar practices and the removal of organs” (United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019, p.2). The definition of trafficking is 
dependent on the presence of all three elements, which assists us in 
separating victims of sex trafficking, from those who choose to work in the 
sex trade. Given that one cannot consent under conditions of coercion, 
deception, fraud etc. non consensual sex work is not sex work at all, it is sex 
trafficking. Bill C-36 draws a distinct link between exploitation and victimhood, 
and refuses to acknowledge the divide between exploitation (which is present 
in most labour under capitalism) from force, deception, coercion etc. as it is 
outlined by the UN Protocol. 
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 The distinction made by the UN Protocol is important given that sex 
work is paid work, and paid work (for the proletarians) under capitalism is 
always exploitive, it cannot be deemed sex trafficking without the elements of 
force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power etc. Definitions 
such as this, could be empowering in that they provide protections to victims 
of sex trafficking, without disregarding the rights and autonomy of sex 
workers such as Terri Jean Bedford, Valarie Scott and Amy Lebovitch. 
Blanket definitions, such as the definition of prostitution as provided by Bill C-
36, fail to acknowledge the diverse experiences presented by women in the 
sex trade. This paper in no way denies the experiences of coercion and 
violence reported by many, but on the contrary recognizes that the 
experiences of the sex trade are intersectional and diverse in their affect. 
 A woman who autonomously and consensually chooses to engage in 
sex work is stigmatized by this law because it situates her as a victim, and 
formally discourages her practice of providing sexual gratification. Sex 
workers who experience misconduct, are unlikely to report violence because 
law enforcement is not required to support her decision to work in the sex 
trade. Additionally, when sex work is criminalized in any form, the interaction 
must be done secretly in order to conceal the identity of the buyer. Overall, 
when a sex worker is highly stigmatized and has no legal protections, she is 
more vulnerable to violence and manipulation by clients and third parties.  
Stepping Stone 
 Stepping Stone is a not-for-profit organization in the Canadian 
Maritimes which supports sex workers (the consenting adult) and those at risk 
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of being sex trafficked, and operates using the harm reduction model. 
Stepping Stone (2018) supports making a distinction between sex work and 
prostitution, and employs the following definition: “Trafficked persons, unlike 
sex workers, enter/ed the sex trade through coercion, force, manipulation or 
threats. When sex work and sex trafficking are conflated, or lumped together 
as one, it causes serious harm. By denigrating sex workers, we are also 
denigrating the ones engaged in sex work unwillingly” (Stepping Stone, 2018, 
p.1). In order to assist both sex workers and those who have been human 
trafficked, Stepping Stone (2018) suggests that we separate those who were 
forced into that trade, from the consenting adults, who are willingly engaged 
in sex work. Plett (2014) concurs and states “To conflate sex work and 
trafficking is both lazy and dangerous. Proponents of this idea rarely provide 
evidence that legalizing sex work actually increases trafficking. In New 
Zealand, where they have implemented decriminalization, that hasn’t 
happened” (p. 2).  These two perspectives were included to support the need 
for more clear distinctions in the law. Treating the conditions of sex trafficking 
and sex work as synonymous is harmful to women’s autonomy and reflects 
how the abolitionist position is taken in the creation of Bill C-36. 
 Throughout my literature review, it became evident that there are 
conflicting definitions regarding sex work, sex trafficking and prostitution, both 
internationally and nationally. This is problematic in that we cannot protect, 
enforce, research or remedy something, which we cannot define. The 
Canadian Public Health Association (2014) is in agreement that unclear 
definitions result in ineffective anti-trafficking efforts and  policing efforts 
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focused on shutting down brothels and arresting sex workers, rather than 
targeting the more elusive traffickers. 
 In conclusion, by denoting both sex work and sex trafficking we are 
encouraging the further regulation of autonomous female bodies. Those who 
have experienced coercion, force, manipulation and overall harm by means of 
sex trafficking, certainly deserve our support as allies and protection by the 
legislation. That being said, we must acknowledge that by lumping together 
women who autonomously choose sex work and those who are victims of sex 
trafficking, and then discouraging all forms of paid sexual services, we are not 
protecting victims and we are simultaneously restricting the bodily rights of 
women in sex work. I cannot support the restriction of women’s autonomy 
and bodily control at the cost of other women’s victimization, especially when 
criminalizing the buyers of sex, has not stopped sex work or its demand, it 
has simply made it more unsafe. For Bill C-36 the focus has always been on 
‘saving’ women from the sex trade, rather than acknowledging and supporting 
the rights of sex workers. 
Critique #2: Sex Work and Capitalism  
 My second critique is Bill C-36’s evaluation of exploitation and 
denial of sex work as legitimate work. Bill C-36 relies on the notion that 
prostitution is exploitive and always a result of constrained opportunities, 
which is a common position in the abolitionist perspective. Bill C-36 
heavily discourages prostitution with no recognition of sex work as 
legitimized work and persists that women in prostitution are exploited as 
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sexual commodities. Firstly, I will point out the presence of this notion 
within the legislation, and then analyze it through a capitalistic framework.  
Then, I will discuss the work of Nussbaum, which explores sex work in 
comparison to other forms of legitimized labour and refer to the 
“Prostitution Reform Act” (Parliamentary Counsel Office, 2018, p.1), which 
serves as an example of the legalization model by legally treating sex 
work as work.  
 It is stated that “Bill C-36 reflects a significant paradigm shift away 
from the treatment of prostitution as “nuisance”, as found by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Bedford, toward treatment of prostitution as a form of 
sexual exploitation that disproportionately and negatively impacts on 
women and girls”(Department of Justice, 2017, p.2). Additionally, the 
legislation posits “Entry into prostitution and remaining in it are both 
influenced by a variety of socio-economic factors, such as poverty, youth, 
lack of education, child sexual abuse and other forms of child abuse, and 
drug addition” (Department of Justice, 2017, p.2).Both of these excerpts 
were selected because they demonstrate the government’s position that 
prostitution is exploitive and a result of limited socioeconomic 
opportunities. My rebuttal to this is that under capitalism all work is 
exploitive (although there are varying degrees of exploitation) and chosen 
as a result of the socioeconomic opportunities available to the subject. Our 
opportunities are limited by our educational credentials, the class in which 
we belong, our age, level of experience, and ultimately our physical and 
mental capacity to participate in an opportunity. A person with little work 
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experience, no high school diploma and piling bills, may have work in the 
low-paid sector as a cashier, not because they desire that work, but 
because that work is within their socioeconomic reach. With regards to 
sexual abuse in childhood, Stepping Stone (2018) says that 1/3 women 
will be sexually assaulted in their life time (p.1), which means that in fact 
some sex workers have been victims of sexual assault during childhood, 
however this does not apply to all sex workers. “The majority of sexual 
assault victims do not work in the sex industry” (Stepping Stone, 2018, 
p.1).  
 Bill C-36 asks us to refer to Section 279.04(1) of the Criminal Code 
for the definition of “exploitation” as used in this legislation. The definition 
reads “a person exploits another person if they cause them to provide, or 
offer to provide, labour or a service by engaging in conduct that, in all the 
circumstances, could reasonably be expected to cause the other person to 
believe that their safety or the safety of a person known to them would be 
threatened if they failed to provide, or offer to provide, the labour or 
service” (Justice Laws Website, 2019, p.1). 
 Marx evaluation of exploitation under capitalism, demonstrates how 
the bourgeoise (production owners) can pay the worker very little, 
maximize production and profit greatly. Additionally, Marx says that 
capitalism alienates the worker from the product, from the means of 
production, from their species being and from themselves (Dillon, 2014). 
The prostitute, in legitimized circumstances, could actually fare better (in 
multiple aspects), than those in widely accepted working class roles, 
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making prostitution a more desirable occupation. When a prostitute is in 
control of her own business, she has many choices in when she will work, 
which clients she will accept, where she will work and how much she will 
charge. Unlike the cashier, the prostitute is fully engaged with the entire 
process, she can work creatively and build/maintain relationships. The 
prostitute could be considered a “petty bourgeoise” (Dillon, 2014, p.144) in 
the sense that she owns the service and is in control of the surplus value. 
One may rebuttal that reformulating the social conditions that prevent 
women from achieving equality may reduce the effects of economic 
disparity, but Marx points out how even the highly educated/skilled (ex. 
professional athletes) are subject to the exploitation of the bourgeoise, just 
on a larger scale. Marx would argue that under the framework of 
capitalism there is no free-will, never mind a discussion of free-will in 
prostitution.  
 It must be made clear, that I am not attempting to justify or 
romanticise one’s engagement with prostitution, for its financial benefits. It 
would be far too capitalistic to associate one’s quality of being and value 
with their financial capabilities, especially if other aspects of their work 
were harmful. The point of this section is to demonstrate that exploitation 
is present in all labour under capitalism, and that while their may be some 
financial benefits to entering the sex trade (or any job), there is space to 
argue that legitimizing sex work has the potential for better working 
conditions (relating to control and relationship to production), than some 
other legitimized positions.  
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 To conclude the discussion on exploitation, I will clarify that I do not 
deny the existence of exploitation or socioeconomic constraint in 
prostitution, I am simply pointing out that a critique of exploitation (as 
defined in the Criminal Code), is a critique of the capitalist framework in 
which we operate. While it is valid to point out the harms of exploitation, 
we cannot justify the prohibition of sex work on the basis of exploitation, 
because exploitation is unavoidable under capitalism.  
Martha Nussbaum  
 Martha Nussbaum is a philosopher and Distinguished Service 
Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago. She was born in 
America in 1947, during the first wave of feminism. Nussbaum (1999) 
takes a philosophical approach when studying the prohibition and 
stigmatization of sex work in “Whether from reason, or from prejudice?”: 
Taking Money for Bodily Services. In this Nussbaum addresses 
prostitution by woman of the age of consent, usually in great economic 
distress. 
 Nussbaum (1999) supports Liberalism for its protection of the 
sphere of choice, and identifies three elements of Liberalism which relate 
to this discussion on prostitution. Firstly, Liberalism is in opposition to any 
approach to politics that turns “morally irrelevant differences into 
systematic sources of social hierarchy” (Nussbaum, 1999, p.57). This 
would entail opposition to that naturalizing of hierarchy, which is present in 
caste systems, feudal systems, and most relevant for this topic, gender 
hierarchy. Secondly, Liberalism is opposed to corporatist political 
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organization, meaning that it does not support the good of the group as a 
whole, if that disregards the well being or agency of individual group 
members. Lastly, Nussbaum (1999) says Liberalism is opposed to 
ideologically based politics because of the restriction on individual 
conscience (ex. religious intolerances).  
 Nussbaum (1999) would argue that prostitution is alike any other 
form of labour by comparing prostitution to the following occupations: the 
factory worker, the domestic servant, a night club singer, a professor of 
philosophy, a skilled masseuse, and a theoretical position called “the 
colonoscopy artist” (p.281). The factory worker is subjected to the same 
health risks and limited economic opportunities as the prostitute, although 
the prostitute may have better hours of operation and improved working 
conditions. Nussbaum (1999) admits that the prostitute is more likely to 
encounter violence in the work place, but says that legalisation would 
allow for the implementation of safety measures. The factory worker does 
not address the gendered components of prostitution and therefore is not 
an all-encompassing comparison. Next, the prostitute is compared with the 
domestic servant, due to the lack of respect in the workplace and limited 
mobility in careers. The domestic servant may experience similar 
gendered components in her position, but will receive less pay and 
exercise less autonomy over her work. Both of these occupations are 
under a great deal of social stigma. Nussbaum (1999) compares the 
prostitute and the night club singer, on the basis that both use their bodies 
to provide pleasure, may have compromised work conditions and must 
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respond to the requests of customers. Nussbaum acknowledges that the 
nightclub singer is not subjected to health risks or bodily invasion. Her 
comparison between prostitution and the philosophy professor 
demonstrated an occupation that requires an invasion of intimate thoughts 
and feelings, but a professor has much better pay and work conditions. 
The prostitute and the masseuse are most closely related in that they both 
provide services using their bodies, to deliver bodily satisfaction. The 
masseuse must be responsive to the requests of the client and utilize 
intimate bodily contact. The main difference between the masseuse and 
the prostitute is respectability according to Nussbaum (1999), but this is 
due to legitimization of their work and asserting their position among 
medical practitioners. Lastly, is the theoretical role of the colonoscopy 
artist, who essentially allows medical training to be practiced on her, 
including the internal probing required for this medical procedure. This 
occupation was included because it mimics the same bodily invasion 
required in prostitution. Nussbaum (1999) realizes that we may prohibit or 
regulate this type of work due to its health risk, but we would not prohibit it 
for its moral violation or attribute this type of work with “fallen women” 
(p.285). 
 Nussbaum (1999) has demonstrated that there is no notable 
difference between sex work and any other industry. The take-away from 
Nussbaum’s work is that our concerns for bodily invasion, health risks and 
economic constraint are present in other bodily labour, but under 
prostitution there is a great deal of stigmatization, which is a barrier to its 
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legitimization. This perspective does not deny the complex elements of 
prostitution, but explores how these elements compare with already 
legitimized labour.  
The Prostitution Reform Act 
 The Prostitution Reform Act (2003) of New Zealand has been 
recognized as a prevailing model of the legalization of prostitution. “Over 
90 percent of sex workers believed the PRA gave them employment, legal 
and health and safety rights. A substantial 64 percent found it easier to 
refuse clients. Significantly, 57 percent said police attitudes to sex workers 
changed for the better” (Crichton, 2015, p.4). The purpose of the act is “to 
decriminalize prostitution (while not endorsing or morally sanctioning 
prostitution or its use)” (Parliamentary Counsel Office, 2018, p.3). Outlined 
below are its main component:  
(a) safeguards the human rights of sex workers and protects them 
from exploitation  
(b) promotes the welfare and occupational health and safety of sex 
workers  
(c) is conductive to public health  
(d) prohibits the use in prostitution of persons under 18 years of 
age 
(e) implements certain other reforms (Parliamentary Counsel 
Office, 2018, p.3) 
This act includes clauses such as: refusal to provide commercial sexual 
services, refusal to work as a sex worker does not effect entitlements, 
clauses protecting those under 18 years of age, powers to enter and 
inspect compliance with health and safety requirements, and clauses 
regarding the proper certification of a business providing sexual services. 
This act legalizes prostitution, recognizes the autonomy of women in 
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prostitution and most importantly explicitly provides rights and protections 
to sex workers under law. This legislation situates the state as an ally of 
women in sex work. With regards to Bill C-36, it is not enough to claim the 
law is in the best interest of women if it does not legitimize women’s 
sexual choice. 
 To conclude my second critique, it is important to recognize that 
although one could argue that prostitution is exploitive, to prohibit it on this 
basis, undermines the exploitation present in all other forms of labour. A 
counter argument may be that prostitution is not alike other forms of 
labour, but Nussbaum has argued otherwise. Grounds to differentiate 
prostitution from other legitimized forms of labour derive from prejudice 
positions, which undermines their validity. The Prostitution Reform Act, 
represents an alternative legislation that upholds female autonomy while 
simultaneously providing legal protections for victims of sex trafficking, but 
the goal is never to increase institutional powers over women’s body. 
Critique #3: Patriarchy and Subordination  
 My third and final critique of Bill C-36, with regards to this research, 
pertains to its evaluation of prostitution as it exists within patriarchy, and as a 
perpetrator of male domination. There are abolitionist arguments present in the 
legislation, which persist that the buying and selling of sexual services upholds 
patriarchy and female subordination, on the basis that women’s bodies are 
thought of as commodities which can be bought and sold on the market. I will 
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utilize the work of Nussbaum and MacKinnon, and evidence from the Prostitution 
Reform Act to explore this topic.  
Prostitution reinforces gender inequalities in society at large by 
normalizing the treatment of primarily women’s bodies as 
commodities to be bought and sold. In this regard, prostitution 
harms everyone in society by sending the message that sexual acts 
can be bought by those with money and power. Prostitution allows 
men, who are primarily the purchasers of sexual services, paid 
access to female bodies, thereby demeaning and degrading the 
human dignity of all women and girls by entrenching a clearly 
gendered practice in Canadian society (Department of Justice, 
2017, p.2).  
I have examined prostitutions likeness to all other forms of labour; however, 
prostitution is approached differently due to the sexual aspects, and its 
position within gender hierarchy. Nussbaum (1999) argues that prostitution: 
is shaped by the perception that female sexuality is dangerous and 
needs careful regulation; that male sexuality is rapacious and 
needs a “safe” outlet; that sex is dirty and degrading, and that only 
a degraded woman is an appropriate sexual object (p.294). 
 Traditionally men have control over female sexuality (ex. abortion laws and 
women’s reproductive rights), but prostitution violates this male control and as 
a result has been highly stigmatized. Prostitution is not the single outlet of 
shaping and reinforcing the gender hierarchy, when we consider institutions 
such as marriage. On the other hand, to criminalize the tradition of marriage, 
based on it’s entwinement with the gender hierarchy would be deemed 
excessive. Alternately, there has been a great push to legitimize prostitution, 
which Nussbaum (1999) agrees would result in dignity and control over 
women’s engagement in the sex trade, and gradually alter the perceptions of 
sex workers and their subordination. The only way in which this gender 
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subordination is going to be dismantled in this instance, is by giving women 
control over their bodies legally and socially.  
 Tim Barnett is a former MP and the general secretary of the Labour 
Party in New Zealand who opposes the Swedish model (criminalization of 
buying sex, and decriminalization of selling sex) after enacting The 
Prostitution Reform Act (2003). Barnett sees the continued campaign for the 
Swedish model as misguided, as the criminalisation of sex workers increases 
their vulnerability by reinforcing the perception that they are somehow victims.  
Some of the people who are sellers are personally really 
vulnerable, but it is the law that can protect them. It is the law and 
their legal status that can uphold their rights”, he said. “[Their] lack 
of humanity is reinforced by bad law. [In these cases,] the state is 
actually helping the objectification, the state is helping the 
oppression”. Barnett opposes demand-focused legislation as he 
believes its only effect is to drive workers underground. (Chrichton, 
2015, p.5)  
Ultimately, criminalizing the purchasing of sex and formally discouraging 
prostitution has done nothing but legitimize the stigmatization of prostitution. 
The social meanings attached to prostitution must be altered in order for 
treatment of women in prostitution to improve. Nussbaum does not deny that 
prostitution has been shaped by male domination, however the perceptions 
society has of female sexuality uphold the female subordination present in 
prostitution, therefore the conditions can only improve when societies 
perceptions are altered.  
 Sex hierarchy is the source of stigmatization in all female roles, that 
are a reflection of patriarchy. Nurses and secretaries are displays of 
overwhelmingly female occupations and reflect patriarchy; in that they play a 
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supportive role to their male counterparts. For example, a nurse plays the role 
of the caretaker and tends to all of the needs of the patient, until the male 
doctor arrives. The doctor is superior to the nurse in terms of pay, respect 
and authority. The ideal secretary is a well dressed, friendly woman who 
mediates the needs of the clients, while upholding the needs of the executive. 
She is expected to serve the executive, but is paid minimally and receives 
minimal respect. It is important to note that the secretary and the nurse are 
often over sexualized roles, when in reality their jobs are not the least bit 
sexual. My intention in pointing out the patriarchy present in other female 
dominated roles, is to demonstrate that regardless of women’s occupation, 
her role in society is subordinate to that of men. Female subordination is 
reality for women in ever-day life, regardless of their interaction with the sex 
trade, therefore abolishing sex on the basis of its interaction with the gender 
hierarchy would undermine the legitimization of other female dominated 
labour.  
Catharine MacKinnon 
 Catharine MacKinnon is a well recognized radical feminist and legal 
scholar. She is a tenured law professor at the University of Michigan Law School 
and a visiting professor of Law at Harvard Law School. Her focus is in Women’s 
Rights in the areas of sexual harassment, rape, prostitution, sex trafficking and 
pornography. She was born in America in 1946, during the first wave of feminism. 
Stemming from her radical feminist perspective is her abolitionist position on 
prostitution and her anti-porn movement, both of which will be discussed here. 
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 For MacKinnon, equality under the law has been defined through male 
standards. This entails that any woman who is the same to a man, is equal based 
on male standards, while women who are not alike men are unequal. For 
example, girls in Canada are provided the same legal rights to public education 
as boys, on the basis that girls and boys both have educational needs. 
Alternately, women have had to fight for their reproductive control, access to 
abortions and access to maternity leave because men and women differ in their 
roles in reproduction. MacKinnon rejects Liberalism on the basis of its 
individualism and reliance on sameness and difference. Instead MacKinnon 
advocates for feminist collectivism, which claims to always have women’s best 
interest in mind and treat each woman as all women. For MacKinnon, unity 
among women also includes diversity.  
 Andrea Dworkin and MacKinnon created the Antipornography Civil Rights 
Ordinance in America, which proposed to treat pornography as a violation of 
women’s civil rights and to allow women who have been harmed by pornography 
to seek lawsuits. Their goal was to expose the sexual subordination in 
pornography, which is one extension of prostitution. MacKinnon insisted that a 
civil law would empower women by providing them the opportunity to report 
harms by the porn industry, and to seek legal redress. This is vital to her 
approach in that a constitutional law would enhance state regulation, and state 
interpretation of harms. The Dworkin-MacKinnon Antipornography Civil Rights 
Ordinance refers to several ordinances associated with anti-pornography 
feminism, on the basis that pornography is harmful to women. The law stated 
“sexual subordination of women through pictures and words, this sexual traffic in 
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women, violates women’s civil rights” (MacKinnon, 2005, p.264). The law was 
opposed by Feminist Anti-Censorship Task Force (FACT) on the basis that 
women need freedom and a socially recognized space to appropriate what has 
been a traditionally male language (MacKinnon, 2005). The FACT brief meant 
equal access to pornography for women who felt porn was erotic, liberating or 
educational (MacKinnon, 2005, p.266). MacKinnon (2005) responded by saying 
“In other words, an entire population of women must continue to be treated in the 
ways the ordinance makes actionable so that this other population of women can 
experience eroticism, liberation, or education at their expense” (p.266). The main 
hindering of this law for the American Supreme Court, was that it was a violation 
of the First Amendment, which protects freedom of speech. For MacKinnon this 
implied that protection of freedom of speech was prioritized over the protection of 
women, and she persisted that porn is an action not a speech. In her view, when 
we position porn as a speech, we treat abusive actions as opinions or ideas.  
 While the law may not have been successful in America, the Canadian 
Supreme Court adopted some of MacKinnon’s approaches to equality and 
pornography in the R. v. Butler case. The main difference between the legal 
framework in Canada and America is that the rights laid out in the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (including freedom of speech) are unbounded and 
therefore have reasonable limits (Bennett, 1997). Additionally, Section 7 of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, pertaining to, ‘the right to Life, Liberty and 
Security of Persons’ is explicitly inclusive of both men and women. These rulings 
formed the basis for Canada’s Supreme Court ruling against pornography. 
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Indeed, the Justices made it very clear that the suppression of free 
speech or expression was not the ultimate goal in maintaining the 
legislation as it stood. The prevention of harm to women, it 
concluded, was crucial to the maintenance of a free and democratic 
society where every individual has equal access to the law's 
protection: "if true equality between male and female persons is to 
be achieved, we cannot ignore the threat to equality resulting from 
exposure to audiences of certain types of violent and degrading 
material. (Butler) (Bennett, 1997, p.225). 
While this was thrilling for MacKinnon, Bennett (1997) discusses two fundamental 
issues present with Canada’s application of this law, which need to be 
addressed. Firstly, in Canada the R. v. Butler case was a constitutional ruling, not 
a civil one, therefore it does not empower victims, and it allows the institutions to 
further regulate at their own discretion. Secondly, the laws which Butler enforces 
against pornography are obscenity laws, which MacKinnon rejects “as a standard 
based on an unjust and unrealistic male-oriented morality” (Bennett, 1997, 
p.226). Although she deems obscenity laws to be counter-productive, it is the 
only avenue in which her ideas have been implemented on this topic.  
 I have chosen to discuss this case for its similarity to the dilemma of 
prostitution in Canada, regarding the prioritizing of rights. The legislation in 
Canada currently restricts the autonomy of sex workers at the cost of 
victimization to prostitutes alike how the American Supreme Court, in 
MacKinnon’s perspective, prioritized the right to freedom of speech over the 
protection of women. I commend MacKinnon for attempting to implement this law 
civilly, as it avoids state control and state discretion. More importantly for me, it 
would allow women to participate in pornography if they so choose, while 
simultaneously providing a legal avenue for women who have been harmed in 
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the production of pornography; However, in Canada it persists as a means of 
control and regulation over sexuality.  
 One of many of Catharine MacKinnon’s reasons for rejecting 
Liberalism is her opposition to the sameness/difference model that she claims 
is reflected in Liberalism. This entails that equality requires similarity, but sex 
requires difference. Under Liberal ideology women are entitled to rights 
because they’re the same as men, and therefore deserving of the same 
protections. The courts adopted Aristotle’s axiom, which meant that equality 
entailed treating like things alike, and unlike things unalike. MacKinnon (1991) 
points out how the American constitution’s requirement of “similarly suited” 
(p.1286) also reflects this axiom. She argues that this is damaging in that, it 
evaluates women’s eligibility for equal treatment on the basis that she is the 
same as the white heterosexual man, rather than on the basis of her 
humanity. “Why should anyone have to be like white men to get what they 
have, given that white men do not have to be like anyone except each other 
to have it?” (MacKinnon, 1991, p.1287). In addition, laws which provide 
special protections for women are not solving the core issues of gender in law 
and rather than creating laws specific to the protection of the oppressed 
female. An example of a law which provides special protection is Bill C-36 
because it positions women as victims in need of protections. In MacKinnon’s 
evaluation of sameness/difference, prostitutes should not require special 
protections against rape and abuse in prostitution because the right for a 
female to not be raped should be enacted and enforced as a human right. 
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Laws providing special protections were brought forth during the women’s 
movement, which called to the end of legal classification on the basis of sex, 
but MacKinnon persists that the content of equality in the laws has not been 
contested. In MacKinnon’s view rather than using white men as a measure of 
women’s ‘fit-ness’ for equality, laws should be genderless and objective. 
 There are other fundamental differences between the abolitionist 
perspective and the legalization model, which are worth mentioning. 
MacKinnon’s (2005) belief is that women’s security in society is already 
insecure, and only made more insecure by the institution in which women are 
“bought and sold” (p.151). The abolitionist view asserts that women in 
prostitution are bought and sold (similarly to slaves) while my own position 
perceives the interaction as buying and selling of sexual services, therefore 
denying self-alienation. MacKinnon disagrees with Nussbaum’s evaluation of 
prostitution in relation to other legitimized labour. MacKinnon (2005) equates 
prostitution with slavery by saying “picking cotton, is not just picking cotton. 
That slavery is a lot of work does not make it just a job” (p.160).  Additionally, 
MacKinnon equates prostitution with a loss of liberty, while I view prostitution 
as loss of liberty for some, and liberating for others, depending on their 
conditions and lived experiences. MacKinnon argues that decriminalization of 
selling sex will stop the state from reinforcing women’s subordination, but that 
the status of women will remain the same. Most of the points made by 
abolitionists, can be remedied over time by legalization of prostitution and the 
implementation of labour rights. These contrasting arguments demonstrate 
the fundamental differences between the abolitionist and those in favour of 
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legalization. 
 In conclusion, it is obvious that the sex trade exists within the 
framework of patriarchy, but I would argue that women’s lived experiences in 
most field’s are a reflection of patriarchy. The best way to liberate women 
against male domination, is to give women legal control over their own 
bodies. MacKinnon’s approach to pornography mirrors the same dilemma I 
discuss with regards to prostitution, but has failed to put the power in the 
hands of the victims, and in-turn has further empowered the state. Laws 
which provide special protections to women are simply addressing women in 
their oppression, rather than dismantling the patriarchy which oppresses her. 
Conclusion: 
Contradictions in Bill C-36 
 It is vital to recognize that when Bill C-36 refers to prostitution, they are 
addressing women who feel as though they are victims, as well as the women 
who autonomously choose sex work. The experiences of these women vary 
greatly based on their control over the interaction, the amount of money they 
receive and the conditions in which they work. One instance of victimization was 
brought forth in Renee Allison Webber’s sentencing hearing, in which her victim 
presented a victim impact statement outlining the trauma and manipulation she 
was exposed to, when sex trafficked by Webber at the age of 16 (Bruce, 2018). 
Webber was found guilty on five counts relating to trafficking, advertising and 
receiving material benefits (Bruce, 2018). Women who feel victimized by the sex 
trade are entitled to legal protections, so that they can report their abuse and 
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ultimately never become involved with the sex trade against their will. In the case 
of Webber’s victim, Bill C-36 was successfully used as a remedy for the 
victimization of a teenage girl, who experienced trauma related to her coerced 
engagement in the sex trade. It is important to note that although justice was 
brought forth for the victim, the victim should never have been victimized in the 
first place. This is one example of how Bill C-36 failed to protect women, 
especially children, from entering the sex trade and experiencing abuse.  
 Alternately, Bedford, Lebovitch and Scott represent the experiences of 
women in sex work who participate consensually, but are seeking legal 
protections in order to conduct their work safely. These women challenged the 
laws against the constitution, in an effort to create safer working conditions for 
themselves, and their collogues. Despite their efforts the government responded 
with Bill C-36, which is in complete violation of Bedford’s aims, and criminalizes 
almost every aspect of sex work. The buying of sex was not prohibited on the 
basis that the law would protect women from victimization by third parties.  
 While claiming to protect women and children from the harms of 
prostitution, Bill C-36 has simultaneously harmed sex workers by restricting their 
autonomy and not recognizing them as participating in legitimate labour. This 
restriction on women’s bodily choice, perpetuates the same subordination on sex 
workers that it claims to combat for prostitutes, which I have identified as an 
intrinsic contradiction present in Bill C-36. Protecting the liberty of women 
involves actually listening to the lived experiences of women and adhering to their 
rights. By restricting the autonomy of the sex worker, the legislation has further 
subordinated women, by determining that they are incapable of making their own 
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bodily choices or being involved in the legal proceedings which govern them 
directly. This is evident because Bedford, Lebovitch and Scott’s rights for 
protection while engaging in legal sex work, were completely disregarded by the 
government. The legislation goes further to aim to abolish prostitution and 
encourage women to leave prostitution. Regardless if someone is a victim of the 
sex trade or a sex worker, leaving the sex trade is not realistic or feasible for 
most women, particularly Indigenous women and those with limited economic 
opportunities.   
 The motivation for this research was to determine how Bill C-36 restricts 
female autonomy through the criminalization of buying sex and how this furthers 
the subordination of women. In conclusion, this research has found that Bill C-36 
restricts autonomy of female sex workers by not explicitly identifying their 
experiences of the sex trade, and conflating sex trafficking and sex work as 
synonymous. The bill has attempted to deny the autonomy of women in sex work, 
(particularly Terri Jean Bedford, Valerie Scott and Amy Lebovitch) by claiming 
that women in sex work are victims. The devastating irony of the emergence of 
Bill C-36, is that when women attempted to influence the laws which govern 
them, the government believed that they had a better understanding of the 
position of prostitutes, than prostitutes themselves. Despite the bill’s evaluation of 
exploitation as a basis for prohibition, this research finds that the exploitation in 
sex work is notably similar to the exploitation found in all other forms of 
legitimized labour, thus undermining the government’s basis. Although 
prostitution is accused of normalizing the subordination of women, women’s 
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position as subordinate to the superior male is present in all female roles, and 
many traditional institutions. The bill actually furthers the subordination of women 
by claiming power over their bodily choices and sexual autonomy. Lastly, Bill C-
36 claims to have introduced the Nordic model out of a need to protect the rights 
of women, however fails to acknowledge that prioritizing the rights of some 
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